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Tourism Regulation Through Accommodation Restriction 
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Recent technological advances have played a pivotal role in altering the tourism 
industry, augmenting the impact of the sector’s rapid expansion by facilitating individual-to-
individual accommodation rentals not regulated under current law. This study seeks to 
understand the specific motivations which prompt local policymakers to regulate the 
burgeoning platform accommodation rental sphere, utilizing a case study framework to do 
so. Relying on qualitative interviews and text analysis, the study identifies factors 
motivating policymakers to regulate Airbnb in the city of Barcelona, Spain. Results indicate 
that the public plays an unprecedented role in the regulatory process, while regulatory order 
and hotel interests play a reduced role. Ultimately, there is evidence that an underlying 
awareness of over-tourism conditions policymaker decisions. 
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Tourism, as an international sector, represents 10.4% of the global gross domestic product, 
and is the second-quickest growing industry in the world (World Travel and Tourism 
Council, 2018). With 1.4 billion tourists, not including domestic travelers, crisscrossing the 
globe annually (UNWTO, 2019), the industry packs a larger punch than it has in the past. 
Technological advances—smart phones, social media, and even wireless internet—are 
altering tourism, along with sharing economy enterprises. Online platforms for home and 
apartment rentals are revolutionizing the provision of guest accommodations. Airbnb, the 
most well-known of these platforms, has been valued at thirteen billion dollars, higher than 
several global hotel chains. (Lee, 2016; Gutíerrez, et al, 2017).   
Growth and innovation in tourism do more than alter the distribution of revenue 
sources in the accommodation sector. More tourists mean more crowded destinations. Packed 
attractions negatively impact visitor enjoyment, but beyond a certain point, increasing levels 
of tourism can also create negative economic and social consequences for the local 
population (O’Reilly, 1986). By connecting hosts with spare rooms or units to guests seeking 
lodging, Airbnb contributes to negative touristic impacts in areas of the city previously 
sheltered from perambulating crowds (Gutiérrez, et al, 2017). Traditional urban planning 
limits such activity—zoning codes control where hotels can be built, for instance—but, 
because Airbnb isn’t a traditional business, rentals facilitated between individuals on its 
platform are usually unconstrained.
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Airbnb effectively transposes tourists from hotels to residential housing. While 
travelers can rent the prototypical Airbnb unit—a spare bedroom in a local resident’s home—
users often list and book whole residences, where the host is not present during the stay or 
does not reside there.  Airbnb promotes the “local host” narrative, but a majority (57%) of 
their listings worldwide feature “entire apartments and homes” and many “hosts” control 
listings for several properties (Gutiérrez et al, 2017). Wegmann and Jiao (2017) show that 
even a small number of these professionalized operators can shape the local real estate 
market—in New York, the 6% of hosts with three or more listings rake in 37% of the area’s 
total revenue on the site. 
Faced with rapid growth in an emerging industry with a profoundly localized impact, 
the task of regulation has fallen to the municipality, even as Airbnb establishes itself as a 
global company. Major cities such as New York have attempted regulation, while the matter 
remains the topic of contentious debate in other cities (Wegmann and Jiao, 2017; Lee, 2016). 
Airbnb faces limited regulation, shapes the tourism industry, affects resident quality of life, 
and hampers the existing accommodation industry. Given so many factors, which 
motivations are foremost on policymakers’ minds as they take action? Motivation is distinct 
from purpose, and conditions legislative outcomes (Howell, 1961), and there are few 
precedents in this policy area to emulate, leaving policymakers to pioneer untested strategies. 
Understanding policy motivations is a critical step in assessing emerging Airbnb regulations 
of this new entity in the tourism field. 
Airbnb and over-tourism are both recent developments in the tourism sphere. Study 
of tourism pressures is generally limited to industry-specific such as Annals of Tourism 
Research (Jurowski and Guroy 2003) or conducted in-house at tourism-specific institutes. To 
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date, there is very little focus on the government’s view or a political science perspective in 
this research. The sharing economy has mostly made its mark on technology publications 
(Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2015), but has shown up in law reviews on the theoretical 
level (Scott and Brown, 2017). Airbnb itself has inspired a handful of exploratory works in 
niche policy journals (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017). Emerging work on Airbnb regulation can 
hazard guesses at efficiency, but has not explored the motivations which prompt 
policymakers to undertake regulation (Wegmann and Jiao, 2017). 
In this study, I aim to evaluate the policy motivations underlying regulatory action 
against Airbnb utilizing a case study. Because this issue operates at the municipal level, it is 
possible to assemble a full snapshot of policy motivations on the relevant scale. The 
Catalonian city of Barcelona presents an ideal situation for study given its primacy in global 
tourism, high levels of annual visitors, active Airbnb market, and recent regulatory action 
against Airbnb. The city has pursued a series of fines against and agreements with the 
company, in addition to wide-sweeping touristic regulation which limits Airbnb activity. In 
order to evaluate policy motivations at the municipal level in the city of Barcelona, I conduct 
a series of qualitative interviews with both policymakers and close observers, as well as 
performing textual analysis on policy documents, public records, and transcripts of political 
debates on the policy. 
The study will proceed as follows: Section I (Literature Review) summarizes current 
research and outlines three hypotheses for the motivations which could influence 
policymakers crafting new regulation on Airbnb. Section II (The Case) justifies the case 
selection and provides relevant background on the city of Barcelona and its connection to 
Airbnb. Section IV (Data and Methods) details the data and methods utilized in the project. 
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Subsequently, Section V (Findings) contains data from interviews and textual analysis. 
Section VI (Discussion) includes discussion and evaluation of this data in light of the 





Previous research reveals three probable sources of motivation for policymakers to 
pursue regulatory action against Airbnb. First, policymakers may be motivated to act to close 
policy loopholes. Second, policymakers may seek to regulate Airbnb based on public opinion 
cues. Thirdly, policymakers could act to regulate Airbnb on the prodding of established and 
politically active business interests, like the hotel industry. 
The long-standing and recently revitalized economic theory of public interest in 
regulation stipulates that governments are benign entities which seek to prevent market 
failures and externalities (Shleifer, 2005). Innovation spurs entrepreneurs to seek new means 
and improvements in a sector, meaning that regulation that adequately protects the public 
may no longer do so when industry changes (Koopman, Mitchell, & Thierer, 2015). Airbnb 
and other apartment-rental platforms are “blurring the lines between private and 
commercial…and undermining zoning strategies” (Scott & Brown, 2017, p. 581) which have 
historically protected residential neighborhoods from influxes of guest lodging 
establishments (Wegmann & Jiao, 2017). Regulation through zoning is crafted with hotels in 
mind, leaving an Airbnb-sized loophole—the same is true for liability coverage, and health 
and safety codes don’t apply. The position of Airbnb outside the regulatory framework 





If a government applies restrictions to a sector for the preservation of the public good, 
as is posited under the public interest theory of regulation, then it should also seek to apply 
those to industry newcomers. A competing theory, the enforcement theory of regulation 
(Shleifer, 2005), nevertheless yields the same conclusion: Airbnb evades regulations applied 
to industry competitors; with this advantage, society cannot expect the market to curb 
undesirable behavior. Of the three alternatives—private litigation, state ownership, and 
public regulation—only regulation is a feasible solution to the Disorder caused by this 
loophole. Placing limitations on Airbnb rebalances the regulatory equilibrium in the sector, 
and ensures the application of previously-established norms. 
 
H1: Policymakers’ decision to crack down on Airbnb listings was an attempt to 
close a policy loophole. 
 
Airbnb units bring residents and tourists into greater proximity, and can generate 
problems such as “noise, nuisance, traffic, parking, and waste management issues” for 
residents (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017). These issues are heightened in “higher-density 
metropolitan areas” where an increase in such activity can be attributed to elevated tourist 
presence via Airbnb (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017). Gurran and Phibbs (2017) also found that 
residents were made uncomfortable by tenant turnover. 
 Airbnb presence, in addition to creating nuisance for residents, can impact the local 
housing market (Wegmann and Jiao, 2017). These impacts may be felt through an increased 
scarcity of rental units or rising costs, especially in tight markets (Lee, 2016). In extreme 
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cases, Airbnb can facilitate the sort of tourism gentrification previously ascribed to tourism 
and entertainment venues (Wegmann and Jiao, 2017, p. 495). 
 A connection between tourism-based political frustration and a lack of government 
responsiveness has been theorized by Duncan McCann of the New Economics Foundation 
(Coldwell 2017). The thermostatic model of responsiveness, which proposes public opinion 
as a determinant of policy outcomes, has held true in a number of national-level studies 
(Pacheco 2013). While current literature is pessimistic about government responsiveness at 
the local level (Devas and Grant 2013), Albalate del Sol’s (2013) research suggests that large 
cities may display the characteristics which facilitate responsive action.  
 
H2: Public opinion and rising anti-touristic sentiments among local residents 
influenced policymakers’ decision to pursue the crackdown. 
 
Airbnb does not face the same restrictions and limitations that traditional hotels do. 
Hotels, for instance, generally require entire buildings for guest lodging, and they must be 
built or acquired in areas in compliance with zoning requirements. Airbnb, on the other hand, 
can make use of existing homes and apartments and often fall outside the regulatory 
environments set up by city zoning codes (Gutiérrez, et al, 2017). Airbnb units may skate 
public health regulations and disrupt established union relationships, in addition to avoiding 
occupancy taxes (Lee, 2016; p. 233). The units offer perks that hotel rooms do not, and may 
be located in parts of the city more conducive to touristic sightseeing. Often, Airbnb units 
cost less than hotel rooms. These characteristics suggest that Airbnb is a direct source of 
competition for traditional hotels.  
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Studies confirm that Airbnb successfully competes with the established hotel industry 
(Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015; Gurran and Phibbs, 2017). In Texas markets, results 
indicate a causal 0.37% decrease in monthly hotel room revenue for each 10% increase in 
Airbnb supply, with revenue in some areas being impacted by upwards of 10% (Zervas, 
Proserpio, and Byers, 2015). Interest groups have previously been strong denouncers of 
Airbnb, and willing to engage in political activity to achieve regulation (Kaplan and Nadler, 
2015). Well-established theory, relying on the basis of the economic approach to political 
behavior, describes how political pressure groups, including industries, can affect policy 
outcomes (Becker, 1983). Such action is often projected as opposition to the public interest 
theory of regulation proposed above—rather than benevolent motivations behind policy, the 
“capture” theory holds that industries are able to influence regulatory outcomes to their own 
benefit (Posner, 1974). 
 
H3: Policymakers were driven to curtail illegal Airbnb listings by outside 
pressure from the tourism industry, namely hoteliers. 
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The Sharing Economy 
The ‘Sharing Economy’ refers to the growing trend of utilizing technology to 
revamp existing means of providing goods and services by using technology to 
facilitate a direct connection between providers and consumers (Cohen and Zenghebot, 
2017). This is often accomplished by way of an application or a website that allows 
provider and consumer to conduct individualized transactions, rather than via 
formalized industry (Zervas, Prosperio, and Byers, 2015; Gutiérrez et al, 2017, p. 278).  
The “alternative benefits” of these services can siphon market share from 
traditional providers (Guttentag, 2015). Yet, by facilitating transactions without 
participating in them, ‘sharing economy’, or ‘collaborative consumption’ companies 
fall into a regulatory gray area (Gutiérrez et al, 2017). Operating outside the existing 
system allows these companies to fill a new space by exploiting loopholes, and they 
often grow quickly.  
Sharing Economy Companies:
Utilize Innovative Technologies to 
Facilitate Established Needs
Compete with and Disrupt Industries 
Which Serve Similar Purposes
Occupy "Interstitial" Regulatory Space
Figure 1: Sharing Economy Characteristics, adapted from Kaplan & Nader, 2015 
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THE CASE – BARCELONA, SPAIN 
Barcelona is a fitting case for examining touristic policy changes, as a major tourist 
destination experiencing a shift in tourism policy under municipal direction. An active 
citizenry, powerful industry interests, and a developed Airbnb presence interact in the city’s 
touristic neighborhoods. The resulting policy affords an opportunity to explore and 
understand the impetus which drives local-level policymakers to act, under conditions of 
competition and strained coexistence. Notably, Barcelona’s policy has spurred recent copycat 
regulations in Palma, Mallorca, and Madrid, Spain. 
Tourism and Over-tourism in Barcelona 
Barcelona is among the top 20 most-visited destination cities in the world (Global 
Destination Cities Index), with over 10 million tourists spending a collective 30 million 
nights in the city’s accommodations (Observatori de Turisme a Barcelona, 2017). Despite a 
lengthy history as a compelling travel destination (Suhett & Forga, 2011), it is only since the 
1992 Summer Olympics that the city has actively promoted itself to tourists and transitioned 
from a primarily industrial working city to a global hotspot (Suhett & Forga, 2011). 
While Barcelona continues to attract and benefit from growing tourism today, there is 
a new discontentment with the phenomenon (Balaguer & Cantavella-Jordá, 2002).  The 
problem in Barcelona, according to its people, is too many tourists. Over-tourism is the 
sightseeing equivalent of over-population, wherein the positive consequences of tourism are 
outpaced by negative externalities as the visitor tally surpasses carrying capacity (Neuts & 
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Nijkamp, 2012). The phenomenon is particularly common in historic cities where narrow 
streets and compact central districts exacerbate the problem (Gutiérrez et al, 2017). People 
laud the economic activity, the wealth, and the job opportunities tourism brings, but detest 
the “massification”, or loss of what makes Barcelona unique, and disruptive behavior of 
tourists (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). Tourists use the city differently than residents—
they frequent specific attractions, make “intensive use of facilities and services”, and 
concentrate their movements in the immediate vicinity of their lodging (Shoval & Raveh, 
2004; Gutiérrez et al, 2017 p. 279). Consequently, tourists can disrupt normalcy in a city. As 
of 2017, more Barcelonans think the city has reached its touristic carrying capacity 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). 
Airbnb in Barcelona 
 The location of guest accommodation contributes to negative effects of tourism, 
because it conditions tourist presence in the surrounding area (Shoval, McKercher, Ng, & 
Birenboim, 2011), and Airbnb units cluster differently than hotels. In Barcelona, while hotels 
and Airbnb similarly preference locations in the city center, Airbnb units are distributed more 
concentrically and permeate traditionally residential neighborhoods (Gutiérrez, et al, 2017). 
Hotels, on the other hand, congregate along the coastline and at the “Ramblas-Paseo de 
Gracia axis” (Gutiérrez, et al, 2017 p. 284). When guest accommodation concentrates in the 
same areas as major tourist attractions, the increase in tourist activity can be a “decisive 
factor in the transformation of the surrounding urban area” (Gutiérrez et al, 2017). In 
Barcelona, it increases tourist pressures on the city center by providing additional 
accommodation in saturated areas and widening the affected area. Airbnb units also create 
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new pressures by increasing tourist numbers in residential neighborhoods near tourist 
attractions where there is minimal hotel presence.  
There are currently over 18,000 listings in Barcelona on the Airbnb website 
(InsideAirbnb). Of these 18,000, roughly 49% are “entire apartment” listings, where the 
“host” does not reside on-site during the stay. (When Gutiérrez, et al, submitted their article 
for review in 2016, before the new municipal regulations went into effect, 54% of listings 
were for “entire homes”.) 42% of Barcelona listings are controlled by “hosts” with 4 or more 
listings posted on the site (InsideAirbnb). 
Tourism is an area of exclusive competency for Spain’s autonomous communities 
(Spanish Const., Título VIII, Art. 148, § 1; Castillo, 2001), and the Catalonian government 
clarified municipal authority to regulate touristic housing when regional law was updated in 
2011 (Diari Oficial 6268-5.12.2012). This legislation allows the city of Barcelona to require 
and issue permits as a prerequisite for inclusion in the regional listing of legal touristic 
housing. Legislation applying to shared apartment rentals is pending—until it is passed at the 
regional level, Barcelona cannot regulate, and renting a room on Airbnb remains an 
extralegal, but not illegal, activity.  
Policy and Restrictive Action – The PEUAT 
During the plenary session on January 27, 2017 the city of Barcelona officially 
adopted the PEUAT1, its primary means of curtailing Airbnb activity. The PEUAT is the 
Plan Especial Urbanístico de Alojamiento Turístico—in English, the Special Tourist 
Accommodation Plan—not a law, but a “special plan”, which occupies a position in the 
                                               
1 See Appendices 1 & 2 for supplementary information regarding the composition and structure of the 




urban planning system between an initiative and a full piece of legislation. Wide-sweeping in 
its scope, the plan encompasses all of municipal Barcelona in three regulatory zones2 which 
determine permissions, or lack there-of, for touristic housing development (PEUAT - 
Ajuntament de Barcelona). The plan broadly defines touristic housing, aiming to limit hotels, 
hostels, guest houses, short-term rentals, and holiday apartments, in addition to Airbnb 
listings. While the PEUAT restricts new development of touristic housing, including hotels, 
there is no penalty to existing businesses, and there is continued development potential 
outside of the most restrictive zones. 
The PEUAT is the main restriction on Airbnb activity because it restricts the 
commodity exchanged via the platform: touristic rental apartments. Under the PEUAT, the 
number of rental licenses issued to apartments is capped at 9,606, with limited licensure 
transfers permitted, thereby creating a legal maximum of Airbnb listings (PEUAT – 
Ajuntament de Barcelona). As a result, it is the primary policy examined in this study. 
However, it is not the only restrictive action which the city of Barcelona has taken against 
Airbnb. The city has levied multiple fines against the platform for allowing users to advertise 
unlicensed apartments, totaling more than €600,000. And, after lengthy negotiations, the 
platform signed an accord committing to the following requirements: granting the city access 
to data to track down illegal units, requiring users to publicly post their licensure number, 
and collaborating on the removal of illegal listings from the site (O’Sullivan, 2018). 
Additionally, Barcelona’s illegal rental apartment detection team, boasting 100+ members, is 
said to be an unprecedented commitment among world cities (Sanz, Plenary Session 01/17, 
pp. 12). 
                                               
2 There is a fourth regulatory zone which is ascribed to three isolated areas of the city which are effectively 
excepted from the PEUAT and under individualized regulations. No new licenses are granted in these areas. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
This study makes use of two main sources of data: interviews and text-based 
documentation. The interviews3 utilized in this study are qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews of roughly 45-75 minutes. I utilized a flexible bank of pre-prepared questions, 
which was occasionally augmented with additional queries based on the conversation or an 
interviewee’s unique perspective—such was the case with the Director of Inspection 
Services, for example, whose role as a non-political public employee invalidated questions 
related to policy formation and justifies inquiry into policy implementation, instead. Some 
interviews took place before the 2019 elections, while others were conducted after, but all 
occurred before any change in office as a result of the elections. At the time this project was 
completed, the new government had yet to be finalized. 
The second part of this study’s source materials come in the form of public records. 
These include plenary session documentation, legal text, and other publications related to the 
policies in question, i.e. publicity documents. Most text sources were collected personally, 
but I also considered statements and industry publications proffered by interviewees, when 
relevant. 
                                               




Municipal Political Parties – Barcelona 
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Partit Popular de 
Catalunya 3 















Members with No 
Party Affiliation 
Gerard Ardanuy 
i Mata 2 
- - 
Juanjo Puigcorbé 
i Benaiges - - 
Table 1: City Council Party Breakdown; Ajuntament de Barcelona public webpage 
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Table 2: Final Vote Results, PEUAT, Jan. 2017 
 
Final Vote on the PEUAT – Plenary Session, January 2017 
In Favor Against Abstention 
Ada Colau Ballano 
Carmen Andrés Añon 
Jaume Arsens Llodrà 
Eloi Badia Casas 
Montserrat Ballarin Espuña 
Montserrat Bedei i Altés 
Alfred Bosch i Pasucal 
Trini Capdevila i Burniol 
Jaume Collboni Cuadrado 
Agustí Colom Cabau 
Jordi Coronas i Martorell 
Daniel Mòdol Deltell 
Josep M. Montaner 
Martorell 
Laia Ortiz Castellvi 
Laura Pérez Castaño 
Gala Pin Ferrando 
Gerardo Pisarello Prados 
Juan José Puigdorbé i 
Begaiges 
Janet Sanz Cid 
Mercedes Vidal Lago 
Santiago Alonso Beltrán 
Gerard Ardanuy i Mata 
María Magdalena Barceló 
Verca 
Koldo Blanco 
Raimond Blasi i Navarro 
Jaume Ciurana 
Ángeles Esteller Ruedas 
Teresa M. Fandos i Payà 
Alberto Fernández Diaz 
Joaquim Forn i Chiarello 
Jordi Martí i Galbis 
Carina Mejías Sánchez 
Xavier Mulleras Vinzia 
Sònia Recasens i Alsina 
Francisco Sierra López 
Xavier Trias i Vidal de 
Llobatera 
Francina Vila i Valls 
Josep Garganté i Closa 
María José Lecha González 
María Rovira i Torrens 
Not Present 
Mercè Homs i Molist 
Total Total Total 
20 17 4 
Stance by Party 
For Against 
Barcelona in Common (Barcelona en Comù) 
Socialist Party of Catalunya (PSC) 
Republican Left of Catalunya (ERC) 
Citizens (Ciutadans) 
Popular Party (PP) 
Democratic Municipal Group (PDeCAT / 
CiU) 
  
Members who spoke or were recognized during debate on the PEUAT: 
Carina Mejías Sánchez 
Janet Sanz Cid 
Daniel Mòdol Deltell 
Jordi Martí i Galbis 
Koldo Blanco 
Jordi Coronas i Martorell 
Alberto Fernández Diaz 
María José Lecha González 
Ada Colau Ballano 
Yellow Highlight: Indicates a Councilmember who was interviewed for the study. While more interviews were 
conducted with dissenting members, the supporters’ list represents fewer parties and official positions. Otherwise, 




Plenary sessions are the primary events for public discussion and debate on policy 
issues for the City Council of Barcelona. These sessions take place roughly once per month, 
and often last upwards of six hours. Though the city archives three types of plenary session 
documentation: agendas (ordenes del dia), legislative summaries (acuerdos), and minutes 
(actas), this study focuses on the minutes, as near-exact transcriptions of council debate. 
Plenary sessions, held in Catalán, from 2015 to present are recorded in a modernized 
procedure. They are filmed in entirety, and supplemented by Spanish-language documents. 
Though it is possible to access plenary session minutes from 1914 to present, this study 
focuses on the plenary session from January 2017, where the council debated and ultimately 
approved the PEUAT, in addition to debating tourist apartments and the housing market, 
specifically. I obtained this material from the municipal website, where it is publically 
accessible. 
 I utilized a thematic coding structure to analyze the selected texts. This process 
involves highlighting key or recurring ideas in sections of the text and grouping them by 
over-arching concepts. Because this strategy does not require approaching the text with a pre-
established code, it allowed me to more fully consider potentially-relevant themes not 




















 I conducted interviews with a diverse collection of tourism stakeholders, including 
politicians, political appointees, public employees, experts and lawyers, and interest group 
representatives. Despite the varied nature of the interviewee list, a cohesive image emerged 
around the PEUAT, easily divisible into four main subgroups: “Innovation, Externalities, and  
Resolution”, “A Focused Public”, “Hotels as an Object of Regulation”, and “Concerns over 
Over-tourism”. 
Figure 3: An Example of the Coding Process utilized in this study 
THE THEMATIC CODING PROCESS 








“She values that the 
debate that has occurred 
has been possible thanks 
to the participation of all 
who wanted to be 
included. And she 
considers that the PEUAT 
is a good example of the 
democratic urban 
planning that the city 
demanded, in the name of 
























Innovation, Externalities, and Resolution. 
 Among interviewees, there was strong consensus that the emergence of Airbnb has 
altered the way that apartment rental functions within the city. Airbnb has facilitated these 
transactions to an unprecedented degree, leading to an explosion in vacation rental numbers 
and making it easier for unlicensed rentals to conduct business. The apartment rental 
situation, as Eva Mur (05.22.2019) put it, has since “got out of hand”. Airbnb paves the way 
for unlicensed “free riders” (Coronas 05.29.2019), and complicates the city’s ability to 
guarantee “[touristic] residences of quality” (Colom 05.30.2019) as codified under the 
regulatory structure applicable to hotels. The necessity of regulation was clear to participants 
who spoke on the issue (Gómez and Pastor, Cobos, Colom, Mur, Ardanuy). Representatives 
of Apartur, Barcelona’s touristic apartment owners’ association, confirmed that the 
association itself “has always sought regulation” of the touristic apartment sector, in order to 
“guarantee sustainability”, with “illegal competition” from unlicensed apartments being a 
major concern (Gómez and Pastor, 06.05.2019).  
 At the same time, multiple interviewees (Mur, Molina, Puig) attested to the regulatory 
difficulties presented by Airbnb’s newfangled sharing economy format, saying that, as a 
“scaffolding that [facilitates these transactions] and takes no responsibility” for unlicensed 
users (Cobos, 06.07.2019), it presented a regulatory challenge. That Airbnb had contributed 
to such rampant growth had less to do with the company than the city’s “lack of [regulatory] 
foresight” (Coronas 05.29.2019). Unfortunately, “the administration is not ready to deal with 
these new technologies”, because the regulatory mechanisms available to the city are, 
practically, the same “that existed in 1859” when it comes to urban planning (Molina, 
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06.06.2019). These criticisms are sustained by a perceived lack of reporting, and opposing 
parties continue to seek information as to the effectiveness of the PEUAT (Martí).  
A Focused Public. 
 The role of the public featured in every interview conducted, though interviewees 
acknowledged varying levels of influence in the matter of touristic housing regulation. As 
Sonia Cobos pointed out, proposed accommodation regulation “was a part of [Barcelona en 
Comú’s] government program” leading up to the 2015 municipal elections, equating the 
party’s electoral success with a level of public investment in the policy. “Activists and [the 
administration’s] base” were major drivers of regulation (Gómez and Pastor, 06.05.2019). 
Interviewees referenced the Survey of Municipal Services, where tourism was “foremost” 
among residents’ concerns for the city and ranked “seventh” (Mur 05.22.2019) overall 
leading up to the election. Public focus on the issue continued to grow; by 2017, tourism was 
the highest-ranked answer to the question “What is the gravest problem faced by the city at 
the moment?”, outranking “working conditions”, “transportation”, “access to housing”, etc. 
(2017 Survey of Municipal Services).  
 “Manifestations” and “complaints” were heavily cited as cues from the public for 
regulation (Marí, Ardanuy, Molina, Coronas, Mur). Ardanuy (05.17.2019) mentioned that, at 
one point, the city was receiving “15,000 complaints per year” from residents about noise 
and other tourist-related “nuisances” (Molina 06.06.2019). These manifestations were 
spurred by “coexistence issues” between residents and tourist apartments (Coronas 
05.29.2019) and encouraged the government to take action (Mur; Marí 05.20.2019).  
According to Jordi Coronas (05.29.2019), Barcelona’s City Council 
“sometimes…fall[s] into populism”—Coronas utilized “populism” to convey a habit of 
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depending on public opinion for guidance, rather than a right-wing, nationalistic tendency. 
Councilman Koldo Blanco (5.10.2019) asserts that some members’ decision to abstain from 
the vote on the PEUAT, in particular, reflects parties’ aversion to opposing the public. The 
Colau executive made efforts to include the public’s views in debate on tourism by 
establishing an advisory Council of Tourism and City where multiple citizens’ groups sit 
alongside industry interests (Colom 5.30.2019, Marí). FAVB (the Federation of Associations 
of Neighborhoods of Barcelona), which sits on this council, claims credit for the inclusion of 
the PEUAT amendment which bans additional touristic apartment licenses (Mariné, 
05.22.2019). 
Certain interviewees challenge the recognition of public opinion in the PEUAT, 
nevertheless. Jordi Martí (05.13.2019) asserts that the government took efforts to vilify 
Airbnb and channel support for regulation. This claim is echoed by Koldo Blanco, who 
suggested that “community entities” and activist groups had been “infiltrated” by actors 
promoting the interests of the governing coalition. I also interviewed a representative of one 
of the entities referenced by Blanco, the FAVB. Pere Mariné assured me that FAVB has no 
official partisan affiliation. Martí also posits that utilizing the “Special Plan” format to pass 
the PEUAT meant a reduction in requisite public involvement in policy passage compared to 
other regulatory structures, though I have been unable to corroborate this in available 
literature.  
Hotels as an Object of Regulation. 
 Discussing the PEUAT and its effect on the hotel industry proved to be an 
overwhelming trend in interviews (Molina, Puig, Colom, Mariné). When asked about the 
PEUAT, interviewees often first brought up its impact on hotels (Puig, Colom, Mariné)—it 
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seems, to some extent, that there is a casual tendency to associate the PEUAT with hotel 
regulation, despite the fact that it regulates all forms of touristic accommodation. This trend 
held true for the policy’s supporters and detractors. Interviewees, however, did not label hotel 
interests as persuasive actors in the PEUAT’s formation. Rather, they were cited, favorably 
or unfavorably, as an object of regulation, a category of accommodation on par with touristic 
apartments. The power of hoteliers in the local tourism field was acknowledged across 
interviews (Colom, Mur, Martí, Ardanuy, Mariné); but, Colom also pointed to a changing 
dynamic, saying that, “Formerly, [the hoteliers and business interests] monopolized” the 
tourism debate.  
The city has made efforts to balance hotel and industry interests with community 
interests (Marí, Colom). Sonia Cobos allowed that the city “heeded [industry interests] to a 
certain level” during an input-seeking phase after the policy was drafted, but not during 
preliminary steps. Later, Colom specified that “we [,the government,] are not attentive to the 
particular interests” of the sector. The focus, according to Sergi Marí is on the public good, 
not competition with hotels—this point is furthered by the distaste felt by the hotel industry 
for the PEUAT overall, which increases the value of existing hotels, but sharply curtails new 
development (Molina). 
To some extent, there emerged a narrative of hotels and Airbnb as peers, rather than 
industry giant and interloper, respectively. Pablo Molina, an urban planning lawyer leading 
legal challenges against the PEUAT on behalf of the hotel sector, confirms that Airbnb does 
represent competition for hotels, and that “the hoteliers [of Barcelona] are against it”. 
However, while Pere Mariné suggested that regulating touristic apartments, especially 
unlicensed ones, would be desirable for the hotel industry, Molina definitively stated that the 
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hotel sector preferred to allow the market to regulate itself. Plus, as was mentioned by both 
Molina and Gómez and Pastor, many hoteliers utilize Airbnb to advertise hotel rooms and 
apartments—it can be “compatible” (Gómez and Pastor) with the hotel industry, and “it’s one 
thing to be against [Airbnb] philosophically, and another to make money” (Molina). 
Concerns over Over-tourism. 
 Interviewees were quick to acknowledge new troubles arising from tourism. 
Commentary ranged from the cautious—“…the public has noticed that tourism has costs and 
benefits.” (Marí)—to the overt—"There is a problem with tourism [in Barcelona]” (Cobos). 
Interviewees described complaints and fears of “massification” (Coronas, Mulleras) and 
“touristification” (Mariné), beyond the more tangible complaints described in previous 
sections. Representatives of Apartur (Gómez and Pastor) remark on Barcelona’s success in 
becoming a city “where the whole world wants to come”, but also describe there being “too 
many people in the street”. 
“It’s our responsibility to ensure that Barcelona continues to be 
authentic.” 
 - Pablo Molina (06.06.2019) 
  
Beyond recognizing over-tourism, interviewees cited it as a direct or indirect 
motivation for establishing the PEUAT. A naysayer called the action “tourismphobic” 
(Martí) but others described the administration’s “attempt to limit this presence [of excessive 
crowds]” (Cobos) and “solve the problems” by “limiting tourism” (Gómez and Pastor). 
Xavier Puig (06.04.2019) who analyzed the PEUAT for the Catalan Competition Authority, 
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felt that the PEUAT’s objectives are vague, but that “it makes sense to limit [all forms of 
tourist accommodation]” if limiting tourism is, in fact, the policy’s goal. Colom, the 
administration’s appointed governing councilor on tourism, cited “maintaining the mixture” 
of uses and moderating housing cost increases as key aims of the policy. The real estate 
market motivation was also invoked by Pablo Molina, who said that “recover[ing] residential 
usage” of neighborhoods like the Ciutat Vella, Barcelona’s oldest district, was one goal of 
the PEUAT. 
Document Analysis 
Because the documents sourced for this portion of the study are varied and intended 
for distinct audiences, reporting their contents thematically is less logical than it is for the 
qualitative interviews conducted. Consequently, findings from the document analysis process 
are elaborated by source, and their contributions to hypothesis evaluation are considered in 
the Discussion. 
Plenary Session, January 2017. 
Three portions of the minutes from the City Council’s first session of 2017 are 
relevant to the current study: the debate and subsequent favorable vote on the PEUAT, the 
discussion of a plan of action regarding illegal touristic apartments, and the failed proposal 
for a governmental report on the PEUAT’s effectiveness. The passing of the PEUAT 
obviously bears direct importance to the scope of the study, while the latter excerpts offer 
supplementary insight into policymaker mindset on closely related issues. 
PEUAT Debate and Passage. 
Municipal parties utilized the period of debate and discussion preceding the vote on 
the PEUAT to describe their stance on the policy. Supporters and detractors differed in some 
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respects, but other themes were consistent throughout the exchange. Nearly every speaker 
explicitly recognized a need for regulation in the touristic lodging sector—disagreements 
were instead centered around the form it should take. Consistent with interviewees who 
described differing economic worldviews as a primary division between the two sides, an 
ideological gap emerges in the text. There is a clear divide between left-leaning and right-
leaning parties4, with the latter emphasizing business interests and an unhampered market 
(pp. 30, pp. 32, pp. 33). Martí, in particular, highlights the anticipated damage to business 
interests, including hotels, that perturb his party (pp. 31-32). A last major theme from the 
debate and discussion of the PEUAT in the plenary session is the marked influence of the 
public in discourse. Multiple speakers from across parties remarked on the elevated role of 
the public in the development in the PEUAT, directly and indirectly. 
Interestingly, one comment from Alberto Fernández Díaz hearkens to Councilmen 
Blanco’s and Martí’s suggestion that the administration has artificially fomented citizen 
support for tourism regulation: “He says that it should be asked why this substantial change 
[in public opinion] has occurred in just one year: if this [change] is a response to the 
demonization on the part of the Government of this economic activity, or the mistaken 
management of the touristic phenomenon, or both…”. Mr. Blanco and Mr. Fernández 
describe different occurrences—the former hints at partisan plants in non-partisan citizen 
groups, while Mr. Fernández posits a wider-scale defamation, more like Martí’s claim. There 
is no further evidence in regard to these claims, but it is notable, given that the three 
individuals come from different parties. 
                                               
4 Refer to Tables 1 & 2 on pages 13 and 14 
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Illegal Apartment Plan of Action. 
The debate on an official government response to illegal rental apartments in the city 
precedes the debate on the PEUAT during the January 2017 plenary session. The executive 
determined that a plan of action against illegal apartment activity to be the natural pair to the 
PEUAT’s efforts to regulate legal touristic apartment activity. A plan of action would be an 
effort to “take on the other face” of touristic apartments. As such, it is a critical text source 
for evaluating policymaker motivations related to regulating Airbnb, and also provides 
insight on the overarching motivations that may be reflected in the PEUAT. 
 This measure is a particular pet project of the Republican Left of Catalunya (Plenary 
Session 01/2017, pp. 12). The president of the party, who later voted in support of the 
PEUAT, is credited with the substance of the following citation from the minutes: 
 
“Mr. Bosch affirms that his group will not give the Government a break about 
confronting the problem of illegal tourist beds, given that this activity interferes 
with neighbors’ sleep through the generation of nuisance and noise—it’s an 
activity that doesn’t pay taxes, doesn’t have inspections for workers, finance, 
or cleanliness. For these reasons, Mr. Bosch and his party affirm that their 
obligation is to look out for the citizenry.”  
[Excerpt from page fourteen of the City Council Plenary 
 Session, January 2017; translation and italics are my own]. 
 
 
Mr. Bosch’s commentary aligns heavily with the public interest theory of regulation. He 
references multiple inspection requirements which have been put in place to guarantee 
standards, but are not applied to “illegal tourist beds”, as well as neighborhood disturbances.  
Despite Bosch’s use of the term “illegal tourist beds”, this concern is applicable to both legal 
and illegal rentals. Bosch also cites lost tax revenue, a problem exclusive to illegal rentals. In 
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his closing, Bosch declares his motivation for regulation is to “look out for the citizenry”. A 
perspective of protecting the public good is emblematic of public interest theory—that, along 
with his note on the absence of regulatory procedures applicable to other forms of tourist 
accommodation, is strong evidence for the regulatory loophole hypothesis. Notably, Bosch’s 
statement does not reference public complaint or desire for regulation. One could infer that 
the government is aware of the “nuisance and noise” through complaints, but he does not 
discuss a recognition of public want. This distinction hits upon a critical point: here, though 
Bosch professes to act on behalf on the public, he is not acting on expressed demands from 
the public. The result is that the passage supports the regulatory loophole hypothesis, but not 
the public opinion hypothesis.  
 Other stand-out themes present in the debate on illegal apartments are a.) a 
widespread and vehement agreement that illegal apartments are bad and need to be handled, 
and b.) recognition that issues of coexistence and cohabitation between units and residents 
are not restricted to illegal units. Of note is a comment from Councilwoman Mejías that the 
businesses of the tourism sector view the Administration as the “principle obstacle” to their 
activity (Plenary Session, 01/2017, pp. 13). 
Housing Market Debate. 
This debate arises from a Popular Party proposed measure to demand release of 
materials related to the effect and efficiency of the PEUAT going forward. Ultimately, the 
measure fails, signaling enough support for the PEUAT in the government to limit desire for 
a strict reporting timeline. For the purposes of this study, this text serves mostly to reaffirm 
the suggestion that support for the PEUAT is drawn along ideological lines. Supporters of the 
measure describe a mismanaged tourism industry that has been unfairly vilified and should 
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not be so heavily restricted. Complaints from interviewees over lack of data are mirrored in 
this section by speakers with similar views. 
Official Legal Text – PEUAT. 
This document is heavily legalistic, and the presumed audience has high technical 
literacy. There is very little justification of policy, reasoning, or emotive language utilized in 
this text, complicating its value for evaluating motives; however, as the complete text of the 
policy evaluated by this study, its inclusion is paramount. And, nevertheless, there is room 
for interpretation. From the contrast between this text and the subsequently described 
Tourism 2020 documents, there arises a distinct impression of the perceived value of public 
approval—the Tourism 2020 documents reveal concerted efforts in aesthetic appeal, and are 
carefully crafted. While this official text is equally cautious in wording, its goal is regulatory 
precision rather than creating a positive impression.  
Article 2, Section 1.b prohibits the presence of future touristic rentals in buildings 
devoted to residential housing from 2015, and from the ground floor of all buildings. This 
indicates a dual focus: preserving the accessibility of the housing market to residents, and the 
accessibility of retail space to commercial establishments. Likewise, Article 23, Section 6 
requires new tourist apartment rentals to seek the approval of other property owners in the 
building before proceeding, suggesting a prioritization of the public opinion in a literal sense. 
“Tourism 2020” Full Text and Publicity Handout. 
“Tourism 2020 Barcelona” is the city’s framework and strategic plan for societal 
sustainability in the sector. It includes measures on and promises revitalization in areas from 
public space to public transport. I have analyzed two documents related to the plan for 
reference to touristic housing: the section on housing in the full text of the plan and a public-
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consumption handout. Each source represents a significant degree of cultivation and curation, 
reflecting the intended audience of the pieces. Touristic Accommodation is only one aspect 
of the Tourism 2020 plan, but the snippets highlighted offer insight into the Government’s 
official position on the matter. 
In the heavily stylized handout, designed to resemble a set of postcards, there is a clear 
emphasis on the housing market as impetus for taking action to regulate touristic 
accommodation. The handout also states a priority to create “a better relationship with its 
environment” for touristic accommodation, hinting at a desire to comply with public opinion, 
or at least decrease clashes over the issue. There is a clear appeal to the public, indicated by 
the focus on these two points amidst a section on touristic accommodation totaling fewer 
than 150 words. 
 As a longer text, the full strategic plan, while still bearing an awareness of the public 
eye, is not directed to the public so exclusively. Herein, the discussion of the touristic 
accommodation sector includes specific mention of the PEUAT as the Government’s primary 
measure, and apartment rental platforms feature heavily. Businesses are referenced as an 
opportunity for greater responsibility, but there is no suggestion of serving their interests. 
Conflict management and coexistence are strong narratives. 
DISCUSSION 
 The regulatory loophole hypothesis is supported by the existence of the Special 
Tourist Accommodation Plan, which curbs Airbnb activity by limiting the location and 
quantity of rental licenses to be issued. However, the PEUAT does not address regulatory 
areas applicable to other guest accommodation, such as health and safety codes—this 
 
 30 
suggests that, existence of regulation aside, fully closing this loophole may not be a primary 
motivational factor. 
 This conclusion is corroborated by interviewees. Industry representatives spoke in 
favor of regulation to curb illegal activity and level the playing field. Political actors were 
aware of a regulatory need, as well as the potential difficulties posed by Airbnb’s sharing 
economy structure. One interviewee mentioned the inability to hold Airbnb to the same 
quality standards as hotels (Colom 05.30.2019), a product of the regulatory inequity between 
the two sectors. There was recognition of the regulatory gap; however, at no point did the 
desire to level the playing field present itself as a primary motivator in the creation of the 
PEUAT.  
Document analysis, though, reveals additional evidence in favor of the regulatory 
loophole hypothesis. There is again notable agreement on the need for regulation, both 
among supporters and detractors of the PEUAT (15PL16354)—indeed, “Tourism’s Negative 
Externalities and the Need for Regulation” emerges as a major theme of the pre-vote debate 
on the Special Plan. Councilman Fernández Díaz’s prioritization of enforcement and 
protection of citizen interests are prototypical of the public interest theory which motivates 
this hypothesis, especially given his ultimate rejection of the PEUAT. Similarly, Councilman 
Bosch’s commentary during debate emphasizes a prioritization of acting in the public interest 
to close enforcement inconsistencies and regulatory loopholes. Nevertheless, there is not 
widespread evocation of this motivation, and I ultimately conclude that there is insufficient 
support for this hypothesis on a systematic level. However, there is a strong indication that it 
may be valid for individual policymakers. 
 
 31 
 There are favorable conditions for the public opinion hypothesis, with strong issue 
saliency and well-organized platforms for vocalizing concern. The administration’s concerted 
efforts to recognize the public voice, as portrayed by community groups, indicate an 
openness to public opinion; additionally, the nature of the governing municipal political 
group as a multi-party political “platform” also conveys a willingness to incorporate popular 
suggestions. Among interviewees, the primacy of public concerns was clear. Interviewees 
were aware of public focus on tourism issues and complaints associated with Airbnb. Beyond 
this, nearly all interviewees cited displays of public discontent as initial triggers for the 
PEUAT. The curated handout for the Tourism 2020 suggests a primacy of public opinion and 
public approval in the Government’s stance, which is reflected in elements of the official 
legal text. The frequency with which public concerns, public outcries, or public displays from 
the citizenry were referenced indicate a strong level of influence in the policy process. It is 
reasonable to conclude that public opinion did motivate policymakers in their efforts to 
regulate Airbnb. Thus, this hypothesis is supported by the study’s findings. 
 The hotel interest hypothesis runs counter to the regulatory loophole hypothesis, 
despite depending on the same action. Rather than proposing that the PEUAT is a reflection 
of benevolence, it holds that industry has manipulated the policy process to yield regulation 
which benefits its own interests. The PEUAT regulates all forms of touristic accommodation, 
such that it also restricts hotels. At first glance, this would appear to weaken the hotel interest 
hypothesis, because it places limits on the industry. However, the PEUAT does not 
negatively impact existing hotels, and it sharply curtails potential competition by virtually 
halting expansion. Interviewees do more to disprove this hypothesis. Though it is clear that 
regulating Airbnb benefits hotels, it is not evident that hotels made concerted efforts to 
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achieve this end. Even if these efforts were made, Eva Mur and Agusti Colom are adamant 
that hotel interests did not factor into the policy’s impetus. The congruence between elected 
officials, the public employee who directed the legal drafting of the plan, and a representative 
of hotel interests makes it unlikely that hoteliers played any significant role in motivating 
policymakers to pursue regulation.  
Document analysis does not reveal any contradictory evidence on the hotel interest 
hypothesis. Touristic Accommodation sections of the Tourism 2020 strategic plan make 
virtually no reference to business interests, and Councilwoman Mejías’s commentary during 
debate on the plan of action shows that there is little love lost between the Administration 
and tourism sector businesses. In the PEUAT portion of the plenary session, business 
interests are again mentioned as damaged or ignored by the policy. Across data sources, there 
is little support for the hypothesis that business or hotel interests influenced the outcome of 
Airbnb regulation. 
Limitations and Notes for Further Research 
 This study provides in-depth insight into an important case in the evolving landscape 
of tourism regulation, with special attention to the role of emerging technology. By focusing 
on policy motivations, a sub-area with very little existing research, I aimed to reveal the 
underlying cues which condition policy outcomes in a field. As always, the case study format 
presents challenges for extrapolation—to combat this, I developed arguments using theory 
and prior research which are not dependent on the selected case, and could not find that 
factors unique to the case conditioned the outcomes of the study. Further investigation of the 
topic in a comparative study or at a larger scale should be a goal for future research. 
Reasonably, exploration of these topics using quantitative and other qualitative approaches 
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could provide increased confidence in my findings, as well as shed light on other elements 




This study aimed to evaluate policy motivations in the regulation of Airbnb in 
Barcelona, as a reflection of how the sharing economy is shifting the tourism industry’s 
regulatory environment. Investigation into the topic through qualitative interviews and 
document analysis revealed a sharp consensus across party lines on the need to act to regulate 
the touristic accommodation sector, and a prevailing view that the situation was out of 
control. At the crux of the matter is Airbnb’s position as just one of many forms of tourist 
accommodation available. In a sector that also includes hostels and hotels, and despite the 
continued dominance of hotels, Airbnb nevertheless warranted specific mention by 
interviewees. It is vocal and visible amongst these other options, which generates additional 
animosity and facilitates finger-pointing. However, in the terms of regulation, policymakers 
did not see fit to regulate its legal activity in standalone policy—illegal activity, on the other 
hand, was pursued in isolation. In the case of Barcelona, restricting not Airbnb itself, but the 
commodity on which it bases its business allowed the city to regulate Airbnb under the same 
legal structure as other forms of tourist accommodation. When combined with robust 
enforcement by the municipality and compliance from the company, the strategy has kept the 
situation in check. 
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As would be expected, policy motivations varied to some degree between individuals 
interviewed and commentary in the documents analyzed. Nevertheless, consistent trends 
emerged in recognizing and including public concerns, often in new ways. There was a 
strong indication that public support for touristic accommodation regulation, and particularly 
touristic rental apartments conditioned government response. The hypothesis that closing the 
regulatory loophole in which Airbnb previously resided motivated policymakers found 
support in policymaker references to acting in the public good and uneven regulatory 
requirements across the sector. These comments were not consistent enough to reflect a 
systematic relevance of this hypothesis, though there were notable indications that certain 
individuals gave credence to this motivation. Lastly, the hotel interest hypothesis was not 
supported by the findings of this study. Nowhere was there indication that hotel or other 
industry interests factored into the content of the PEUAT, though certain elements align with 
industry preferences. Overall, industry and its political supporters were disapproving of the 
PEUAT. 
Woven around commentary relevant to the hypotheses were two other marked trends 
in policymaker motivation: the housing market and recognition of over-tourism. The two are 
inextricably related, and while they overlap with the hypothesis put forth in this study, they 
are also distinct. There is an indication that over-tourism is conditioning not only public 
opinion, but is also directly influencing policymakers. This idea, along with the more 
concrete findings of the study, reveal important mechanisms at play, with implications for the 




Appendix 1: Barcelona’s Municipal Government 
Barcelona utilizes a system of proportional representation, with an executive cabinet 
appointed by the mayor and a democratically-elected legislative council (Spanish Const., 
Title VIII, Art. 140). The council consists of 41 seats and incorporates representatives from 
nine political parties at the time of study (Ajuntament de Barcelona), though two 
councilmembers have no current partisan affiliation. In the 2015 – 2019 Council, none of the 
nine parties possesses a majority. During the time frame relevant to this project, the head 
executive’s party, Barcelona en Comú, held eleven of 41 seats, and governed in minority 
through an informal coalition with the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC). The combined 
seven members of the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) and the Republican Left of Catalonia 
(ERC) lent occasional support.  
Through the executive, the municipality of Barcelona has a left-wing bent during the 
period evaluated during this study, though the council itself has only the slightest left-leaning 
majority split across four parties. With a strong right-wing minority, it is reasonable to expect  
considerable resistance to the governing party’s propositions in most debates. Notably, 
Barcelona’s municipal government is also sub-divided by the Catalonian independence issue, 
in addition to partisan identification. Though the disputed referendum was held in 2017, the 
independence movement remains a present and divisive issue in Barcelona politics (Crónica 
Global, 2018). Parties take a clear stance on the issue, usually identifying as pro-union or 
pro-independence. Others, like governing party Barcelona en Comú, declare themselves in 
favor the region’s right to self-determination, rather than a specific side. 
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Appendix 2: Members of the Municipal Council 
Municipal Government at Time of Study 
Parties and Members, 2015-2019 
Barcelona in 
Common 




Demòrata / PDeCAT) 
Citizens 
(Ciutadans) 
Republican Left of 
Catalunya 
(Esquerra Republicana 
Catalana / ERC) 
§ Ada Colau Ballano 
§ Gerardo Pisarello   
Prados 
§ Laia Ortiz 
Castellví 
§ Jaume Asens 
Llodrà 
§ Janet Sanz Cid 
§ Gala Pin Ferrando 
§ Agustí Colom 
Cabau 
§ Laura Pérez 
Castaño 
§ Mercedes Vidal 
Lago 
§ Josep Maria 
Montaner 
Martorell 
§ Eloi Badia Casas 
§ Xavier Trias Vidal 
de Llobaera 
§ Sònia Recasense  
Alsina 
§ Jaume Ciurana  
Llevadot 
§ Jordi Martí Galbis 
§ Mercè Homs 
Molist 
§ Francina Vila 
Valls 
§ Teresa Maria 
Fandos Payà 
§ Raimond Blasi 
Navarro 
§ Irma Rognoni 
Viader 
§ Carina Mejías  
Sánchez 
§ Maria Magdalena  
Barceló Verea 
§ Francisco Sierra  
López 
§ Santiago Alonso 
Beltrán 
§ Koldo Blanco 
Uzquiano 
§ Alfred Bosch i 
Pascual3 
§ Montserrat Benedí 
Altés 
§ Trini Capdevila  
Burniol 







3Leader of the ERC at the time 
of the PEAUT vote, Bosch I 
Pascual was tapped as Minister 
of Exterior for the Regional 
Government in 2018, and was 
then replaced in the council by 
Gemma Sendra Planas 
Socialists’ Party of 
Catalunya 
(Partit de Soacialistes 
de Catalunya / PSC) 
Popular Party 
(Partit Popular / PP) 
Candidacy of 
Popular Unity 
(Candidatura d’ Unitat 
Popular / CUP) 
Unaffiliated 
Members 
§ Jaume Collboni 
Cuadrado 








§ Xavier Mulleras 
Vinzia 
§ Alberto Villagras 
Gil 
§ Maria Rovira 
Torrens 
§ Eulàlia Reguant 
Cura 
§ Pere Casas 
Zarzuela 
§ Gerard Ardanuy 
Mata 




Appendix 3: Interviewees 
Individuals Interviewed 
Name Position Status Date / Time 




June 7, 2019 
09:00 
Pablo Molina Lawyer & Urban Planning Specialist Private Sector 
June 06, 2019 
13:00 
Judith Gómez de la 




Private Sector - 
Advocacy Group 
June 05, 2019 
14:00 




Public Employee June 04, 2019 11:00 
Jordi Coronas Councilmember 
Elected Official – 
Esquerra Republicana 
Catalana 






Elected Official – 
Barcelona en Comù 
May 30, 2019 
12:30 
Xavier Mulleras Councilmember Elected Official – Partido Popular 
May 14, 2019 
12:40 
Eva Mur Director of Inspection Services 
Non-Political Public 
Official 








May 22, 2019 
13:30 
Sergi Marí 





May 20, 2019 
12:30 
Gerard Ardanuy Councilmember Elected Official – No Party Affiliation 
May 17, 2019 
10:00 
Koldo Blanco Councilmember – Ciutat Vella 
Elected Official – 
Ciutadans 
May 10, 2019 
09:30 
Jordi Martí Councilmember Elected Official – PDeCAT 
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